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  Supply chain coordination as an effective tool plays an important role in improving supply 
chain performance. In this article, a two-level supply chain with one manufacturer and two 
retailers is considered. The order quantity that retailers are faced with depends on the amount of 
advertisements and both retailers compete with each other on advertising. The Stackelberg 
game is established between manufacturer and retailers such that the manufacturer and the 
retailers play the leader and the follower roles, respectively. First, the manufacturer determines 
the wholesale prices for retailers and instead, the retailers determine the order quantity and 
advertising level, simultaneously. The manufacturer produces one kind of product and delivers 
it to retailers before the beginning of selling season. Retailers can affect the order quantity 
regarding the demand dependency on advertising level through the incurred costs from the 
advertising. In this paper, we show that we can achieve the desirable supply chain coordination 
through using combined quantity discount and advertising cost sharing contracts. We also 
consider the win-win situation for all the members of the supply chain.   
  © 2012 Growing Science Ltd.  All rights reserved
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1. Introduction 
 
Today, there are growing challenges on business environment because of increase in competition and 
customer expectations. Therefore, in this situation companies should have a good flexibility to 
respond to new market requirements, achieve the highest profit from opportunities, and suffer the 
lowest possible losses from threats (Hosseini, 2008). Two well-known tools for improving 
competitiveness in the supply chain are integrating organizations and creating coordination among 
material flows, information and capital. Therefore, to overcome these obstacles, setting the 
orientation of goals and accelerating the flows among supply chains are common issues in this 
context.  
 
In decentralized supply chains, each chain member is first concerned about optimizing its goals and 
in this condition; there might be some conflicts between these goals, which can reduce the 
performance of supply chain. Therefore, coordination plays an important role in supply chain   384
performance improvement and in this case, the contracts allocated a large number of research paper 
to themselves as a coordination mechanism. Cachon (2003) performed a comprehensive review on 
coordination literature with contracts approach and evaluated different scenarios in newsvendor 
problem under different conditions. Tsay et al. (1998) established another study on various contract 
types and tried to determine their conceptual frameworks in order to classify the literature on supply 
chain coordination. Most primary researches in this field considered the demands as determined or 
fixed. Most of the times, the amount of advertising and customer service providing have important 
roles in supply chain and attracting demands which are mostly proposed in insurance industries and 
supply chains with fixed price level for the end customer. A retailer can affect the products demand 
through advertising, employing new sales representatives, market development and these activities 
can increase demand. All of these activities are costly, thus encouraging supply chain members to 
increase the amount of advertising is an important issue that has been mentioned in some papers. 
Most of the articles that considered the advertising effect used a two-level supply chain with one 
supplier and one retailer.  
 
Taylor (2002) explained that the chain can be coordinated through a combination of sales rebate and 
buyback contracts. He et al. (2009) studied the supply chain coordination with demand dependency 
on sales advertisement and price using the changes in contracts. They explained that none of the 
traditional buyback and revenue sharing contracts could coordinate the supply chain and we can only 
achieve complete supply chain coordination through a combination of these contracts and use of 
penalty contract. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) demonstrated that the revenue sharing contract cannot 
coordinate the supply chain and proposed a simple quantity discount contract for coordination. 
Netessin and Rudi (2000) suggested combined revenue and cost sharing contracts to coordinate a 
supply chain.  
 
Quansheng et al. (2010) also demonstrated that it is possible to coordinate a supply chain with 
advertising dependent demand through using quantity flexible and advertising cost sharing contracts. 
Kaya (2011) assessed the supply chain contracts with advertising and cost dependent demand and 
advertising effect in two cases that both retailer and manufacturer allocate separate costs for 
advertising. Qinghua et al. (2008) reviewed a supply chain with price and advertising dependent 
demand such that the manufacturer once alone and once with retailer performs advertising actions 
and showed that using the revenue sharing contracts, this supply chain can be coordinated. Xie and 
Wei (2009) considered a supply chain with price and advertising dependent demand and assessed this 
supply chain coordination in two cases: partnership and non-partnership advertising. They explained 
that in partnership, advertising case a better coordination could be achieved among supply chain 
members and the wholesale price for retailers would be decreased. Shi-Zhen and Juan (2009) 
considered a supply chain with fixed price and two decision variables for retailer: order quantity and 
advertising level. They used buyback contract and advertising cost sharing and showed the situation 
the supply chain will be coordinated. 
 
Few articles evaluated the competition effect between upstream or downstream members (Choi, 
1996; Parlar & Weng, 2006). They supposed that the two retailers have an equal competitive power 
in their exclusive market. Competition on price has been studied on some other articles such as Yao 
et al. (2008) and Wong and Leung (2008) but competition on advertising between retailers never has 
been evaluated. Yu et al. (2009) analyzed the production supply chain vendor managed inventory M. Mirzaee et al. / International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations 3 (2012) 
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with one manufacturer and several retailers with advertising and price dependent demand rate. They 
used the stackelberg game for decision making.  
 
In this paper, retailers decide on price and advertising issues after the policy determination of the 
manufacturer. The manufacturer determines the order quantity for retailers and the competition effect 
between retailers have not considered here. In section 2, the assumptions and conditions under which 
the model is defined, is shown. In section 3, non-coordinated decentralized supply chain is assessed 
and in this case the optimal parameters and the expected benefit for all members and the total chain 
are identified. Section 4 examines the centralized supply chain to determine the optimal supply chain 
parameters. These parameters will be used in section 5 for the decentralized supply chain 
coordination in order to encourage the retailer to set the optimal supply chain parameters through 
using coordinator contracts. In this section it is shown that in addition to establishing the win-win 
situation, supply chain coordination will be established. Section 6 shows a numerical example of 
using the proposed method for coordinating the supply chain and also the competition effect between 
retailers is analyzed. Finally, the conclusion is provided in Section 7.   
 
2. Assumptions and model parameters 
It is assumed that all supply chain members are in one market, the demand faced by each retailer is 
probable and dependent to the amount of advertising and all retailers compete with each other on 
advertising. The Manufacturer and retailers behaviors are based on stackelberg game. First the 
manufacturer determines its strategy and then the retailers based on the wholesale price that the 
manufacturer determines will determine the order quantity and advertising level to optimize their 
expected profit. Based on the order quantity of each retailer, enough goods will be produced by the 
manufacturer and they are delivered to retailers before the start of the selling season. It is assumed 
that the manufacturer has an unlimited capacity.  
 
Xi is the real demand faced by i
th retailer that could be written as Xi=Di+εi where Di is the identified 
and linear demand which is dependent on advertising. We have Di= ai + biei - kiej and εi is the random 
and advertising independent factor which is defined in limited range of [Ai,Bi] for i={1,2}, j=3-i and 
Also ai is the initial demand, bi is the demand sensitivity of ith retailer for its own advertising and ki is 
the demand sensitivity of i
th retailer for its rival’s advertising. It is assumed that ai,bi>0 and bi>ki, 
which means that each retailer demand mostly depends on its own advertising than its rivals which 
seems to be reasonable. To ensure that the demand rate for any advertising level is positive,   Ai>-ai 
condition must be satisfied. It is assumed that the random demand factor has a probability density 
function f(.) with a continuous derivate f￿(.) and a continuous cumulative distribution function with a 
strictly increasing inverse, F(.). Also it is assumed that the ith retailer spends gi(ei) advertising cost for 
the ei advertising level which is an increasing function based on the advertising level. 
 
The below parameters are used in our model: 
ai: The initial order quantity for ith retailer, 
bi: The demand sensitivity of ith retailer on its own advertising, 
ki: The demand sensitivity of ith retailer on its rival’s advertising, 
Si: The shortage cost per unit for the ith retailer, 
C: Manufacturer cost per unit, 
Xi: The real demand that the ith retailer faces (where Xi=Di+εi),   386
εi: The random factor of ith retailer, 
fi(.): The probability density function of the random demand factor for the ith retailer, 
Fi(.): The cumulative distribution of the random demand factor for the ith retailer, 
gi(.): The advertising cost function for the ith retailer, 
w0i: The wholesale price per unit for the ith retailer under the wholesale contract, 
pi: The selling price per unit which is set by the manufacturer for the end customer, 
ei: Advertising level for the ith retailer, 
Qi: Order quantity for the ith retailer, 
ΠRi: The expected profit for the ith retailer, 
ΠM: The expected profit for the manufacturer, 
ΠT: The expected profit for the supply chain, 
The decision variables are Qi and ei for the ith retailer and wi for the manufacturer and also two 
conditions pi>w0i>C>0 and Si>0 are considered to make the results reasonable. 
 
3. Non-coordinated decentralized supply chain 
In a decentralized supply chain in non-coordinated state, both manufacturer and retailers decide under 
the stackelberg game to improve their profit share. This means that the manufacturer and the retailers 
play the leader and the follower roles, respectively. First the manufacturer determines the wholesale 
prices for retailers in wholesale contract and instead the retailers determine the order quantity and 
advertising level, simultaneously. For simplicity, we assume that the salvage value per unit is equal to 
zero, so that the expected profit for the i
th retailer in this case would be as follows, 
 
Π  
      E min   ,Q        Q    E  X                 .  (1)
 
Substituting     a                   ε  and defining zi=Qi-Di, the Eq. (1) yields the following, 
 
Π  
        a                   E   m i n    ,ε   )      a                        E  ε          
      . 
(2)
Since   ε           ε   m i n    ,ε   and   ε     μ , the expected profit for the ith retailer can be 
written as: 
Π  
       a                      a                                       E min   ,ε   
        , 
(3)
and we have 
E min   ,ε      xf  x dx       f  x dx     xf  x dx      x     f  x dx
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   ,         (4)
Defining  ∆           x      f  x dx
  
    thus E min   ,ε    can be written as     ∆       that the 
expected profit objective function for the ith retailer is given as:  
maximze Π  
  ,  (5)
 
where i={1,2} and j=3-i. Now by differentiating this equation with respect to ei we would have: 
 
 Π  
 
   
                   ′      0 .  
(6) 
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Next, by solving Eq. (6) the optimal advertising level for the ith retailer can be calculated. Similarly, 
differentiating Eq. (3) with respect to zi yields, 
 Π  
 
   
             1                 0 .  
 
(7)
Thus, the optimal value under the non-coordinated decentralized supply chain can be calculated as 
follows, 
        
             
       
.   
(8) 
 
Thus the optimal values in the non-coordinated decentralized supply chain for i={1,2} based on Eq. 
(6) and Eq. (8) are   
 ,   
 ,   
  and   
 . The optimal order quantity for each retailer can be calculated 
based on equation Qi=Di+zi for i={1,2} and j=3-i is equal to: 
 
  
   a         
        
      
   (9)
 
Lemma 1: the expected profit for retailers with respect to ei and zi is convex. 
Proof: we form the Hessian matrix for the expected profit of retailers in the non-coordinated situation.  
 
HRi=  
   
′′                  
                          
                          
                
 
Note that f      is the probability density function and        is the non-decreasing function with 
respect to advertising levels, thus the convexity condition holds.  ■ 
For a more accurate analysis, we can divide the expected profit for the manufacturer into two parts in 
which the expected profit for the manufacturer from the i
th retailer is equal to: 
 
Π  
   =(         a                       (10)
 
4. Centralized supply chain 
In centralized supply chain, it is supposed that both manufacturer and retailers are trying to integrate 
the channel and to increase the total profit of the supply chain. Thus the centralized supply chain 
objective function to maximize the total profit of the supply chain which is consist of the summation 
of both the manufacturer and retailers expected profits can be calculated as follows: 
max Π    Π   
 
   
 Π   
 
(11)
Thus, the total expected profit for the supply chain is equal to: 
 
Π       p  E min   ,X           E  X                  
 
   
. 
 
(12)
 
 
Substituting Xi=ai+biei-kiej+εi and zi=Qi-Di yields,   388
Π       p   a                 E   m i n    ,ε       c a                        E  ε         
 
   
          
 
(13)
 
By differentiating the total expected profit, Eq. (13), for the supply chain with respect to ei we have: 
 Π 
   
               ′          c       0 .  (14)
and similarly by differentiating with respect to zi we have: 
 Π 
   
             1             0 ,  
(15)
and zi can be calculated by the following, 
        
          
       
.  (16)
Therefore, we can calculate the optimal order quantity and advertising level based on Eq. (14) and 
Eq. (16) and these optimum values in this case are called   
 ,   
 ,   
  and   
  where the optimal order 
quantity in this case for    1,2  and   3     can be calculated as follows, 
 
  
   a         
        
      
 .  (17)
 
Lemma 2: The total expected profit for the supply chain with respect to ei and zi is convex. 
Proof: we form the Hessian matrix for the total expected profit of the supply chain.  
 
HT= 
   
′′                  
                          
                          
               , 
 
which is exactly the same as the Hessian matrix of the expected profit for retailers in non-coordinated 
condition and since f      is the probability density function and        is a non-decreasing function 
with respect to advertising levels, thus the convexity condition holds. 
 
5. Coordinated decentralized supply chain 
In this section for establishing supply chain coordination, two proposed quantity discount and 
advertising cost sharing contracts are used. The manufacturer encourages the retailers by offering the 
quantity discount contract to increase their order quantity. Thus, in this case retailers accept to 
investigate more on advertising and because demands on the amount of advertising, the advertising 
cost sharing contract will be used. Based on this contract, the manufacturer pays a part of the 
retailers’ advertising cost so the retailers will be encouraged to increase their advertising rates and 
this consequently will increase customer demand. Therefore, by using this combined contract it is 
shown that the supply chain coordination will be established. The expected profit for retailers in this 
case would be equal to: 
Π  
       a        
        
       a        
        
      
                    E min   
 ,ε   
         
  , 
(18)
 
where wi is the wholesale price under the quantity discount contract and θi is the advertising cost 
share for the i
th retailer and obviously 1-θi is the advertising cost share for the manufacturer. The 
expected profit for the manufacturer from the i
th retailer can be calculated as: M. Mirzaee et al. / International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations 3 (2012) 
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Π  
  = (         a         
        
      
    1          
  .  (19)
 
However, the manufacturer and the retailers will accept this coordinator contract when their expected 
profits become higher or at least equal to the non-coordinated state. So from the perspective of the 
retailer, the following condition must hold, 
 
Π  
     
 ,   
     Π  
     
 ,   
  ,  (20)
 
and therefore we have, 
    
 
  
      E min   
 ,   
    E min   
 ,   
              
      
           
      
  
 
   
 1          
          
  .                                                                                                              
 
(21)
Similarly, from the perspective of the manufacturer, the following condition must hold, 
 
Π  
     
 ,   
   Π  
     
 ,   
 ).  (22)
  
Therefore, we have: 
 
    
1
  
      
     1          
               
  . 
 
(23)
 
Thus if the coordinator contract establishes the Eq. (21) and Eq. (23) conditions, always both the 
manufacturer and the retailers will benefit from it. In fact, by setting the wholesale price in the range 
of       ,        it is possible for the manufacturer to establish the wholesale price in this range for 
coordination. 
In this section, we propose the Nash complete equilibrium model to evaluate the supply chain 
performance. In this case, we have            and based on this, we calculate the expected profits 
for both the manufacturer and the retailers. The total expected centralized supply chain profit under 
the Nash complete equilibrium model will be equal to the summation of both the manufacturer and 
retailers profits. When         , the increase in system profit because of the coordination will be 
equal to the increase in the manufacturer's profit. The increase in the manufacturer profit can be 
shared through negotiation by means of mutual agreement sharing programs. Therefore, the model 
will achieve the complete supply chain coordination and also the win-win condition for all the supply 
chain members will be established. 
 
6. Numerical example 
In this section, a numerical example is presented to describe the coordination model and verify the 
acceptable performance of the coordinator contracts.  We assume that the demands for the retailers 
are      100   10    3       ε  for i={1,2} and j=3-i and εi follows a uniform distribution within the 
interval of [0,5]. The other parameters are defined as follows: 
 
    2 ,  5 ,     2 5 ,     0 . 7 ,      2 0    390
Also, we consider the cost function for the i
th retailer as        
  
 
   . Using the MATLAB 7 
software, the optimal values and expected profits are shown in Tables 1 and Table 2.  
 
Table 1  
The optimal values 
  Supply chain non-coordinated  Coordinated supply chain 
zi  1.29  4.07 
Qi 416.29  1084.1 
wi  20  16.79 
ei 45  140 
 
Table 2  
The optimal expected profits 
  Supply chain non-coordinated  Coordinated supply chain 
ΠRi  964.76  1003.1 
ΠMi 6244.4  9910.9 
ΠT  14418.32  21828 
 
According to Table (1), it is observed that in the coordinated case the wholesale price for retailers is 
lower than the one in the non-coordinated form. Thus, both the order quantity of the retailers and the 
advertising level are increased and in this case according to Table 2 the expected profit for the 
retailers, the manufacturer and the whole supply chain are increased. Therefore, we can conclude that 
the combined contract is efficient.       
 
6.1. The competition effect 
In this section, we will examine the competition effect between retailers in the amount of advertising. 
The demand that the ith retailer is faced can be written as                                       ε  so 
we can measure the competition effect through changing the ki value while fixing the bi-ki value. We 
used the method suggested by Yao (2008) and Tsay and Agrawal (2000) to examine the competitive 
factor. Thus, the following results will be deducted from the Tables 3 and Table 4. 
 
Table 3  
The competition effect in non-coordinated supply chain  
bi-ki  bi k i Q
d
i e
d
i  ΠRi  ΠMi  ΠT E f 
7  9  2  416.29  45  964.76  6244.44  14418.42 0.1544
7  10  3 451.29 50 902.26  6769.44  15343.42 0.1332
7  11  4  486.26  55  814.76  7294.44  16218.42 0.1116
7  12  5 521.29 60 702.26  7819.44  17043.42 0.0898
9  10  1  551.29  50  1402.26  8269.44  19343.42 0.1695
9 11  2  596.29  55  1364.76  8944.44  20618.42 0.1525
9  12  3  641.29  60  1302.26  9619.44  21843.42 0.1353
9 13  4  686.29  65 1214.76  10294.44  23018.42 0.1180
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Table 4  
The competition effect in coordinated supply chain 
bi-ki  bi k i Q
c
i e
c
i  ΠRi  ΠMi  ΠT E f 
7  9  2  1084.1  140  1065.58  9848.35  21827.88 0.1081
7 10  3  1084.1  140  1003.08  9910.85  21827.88 0.1012
7  11  4  1084.1  140  915.58  9998.35  21827.88 0.0915
7 12  5  1084.1  140  803.08  10110.85  21827.88 0.0794
9  10  1  1724.1  180  1503.08  15810.85  34627.88 0.0950
9 11  2  1724.1  180  1465.58  15848.35  34627.88 0.0924
9  12  3  1724.1  180  1403.08  15910.85  34627.88 0.0881
9 13  4  1724.1  180 1315.58  15998.35  34627.88 0.0822
     
When competition is intensified, advertising rates and order quantity will be increased. Also the 
expected profit for the retailers and the manufacturer will be reduced and increased respectively and 
we can conclude that the intensified competition will not benefit the retailers and vice versa the 
manufacturer will receive more profits from this intensified competition between the retailers and 
also the total supply chain profit will be increased, simultaneously. Therefore, intensifying the 
competition will improve the performance of the channel. Intensifying the competition, Ef which is 
defined as Ef= ΠRi / ΠMi will be decreased and as mentioned this shows that the manufacturer will 
achieve more advantages than the retailers. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this research, a two-level supply chain with one manufacturer and two retailers have been studied 
in which the retailers are faced with probable advertising rate dependant demand. In this study, we 
used a combined quantity discount and advertising cost sharing contracts to coordinate the supply 
chain and it is shown that the supply chain coordination will be fully established which means that 
the decisions of the supply chain members will be made according to the combined contract so that 
the total supply chain profit will be maximized. In addition, the win-win conditions are considered for 
the supply chain members where the supply chain members will achieve more profit by accepting the 
coordinator contract and this can encourage them to accept it. Here, it is shown that the competition 
between supply chain members will affect the total chain profit. When this competition intensified, 
both the total supply chain and the manufacturer benefits will be increased but the retailers will suffer 
from this condition. 
 
Other factors including the price can be considered as decision variables in model development. In 
this model, it is assumed that the price is fixed and is determined by the manufacturer. In addition, the 
price can be considered as a competitive factor between retailers and in this case, the model will 
become more complicated. Besides, a condition with several manufacturers with a competitive factor 
among them to sell their products to the retailers has not been considered in this model and can be 
used as one of the important future research topics in this field. 
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